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Abstract
Using linked employer-employee data for Portugal, we explore an amendment
to the minimum wage law which increased from 75% to 100% of the full minimum
wage applied to employees younger than 18. Our results show a widening of the
gender wage gap following the amendment: the wage gap for minors increased 2:7
percentage points more than for other groups. This change was mainly determined
by a redistribution of fringe benets and overtime payments. We discuss three
possible sources of redistribution: (i) a change in the skill composition of the
working males and females after the increase in the minimum wage, (ii) industrial
di¤erences in response to the changes in the wage oor, and (iii) discrimination.
Estimations support the second channel as the main contributing factor, while
possible discrimination e¤ects cannot be eliminated.
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1 Introduction
Does a minimum wage increase close the gender wage gap? Empirical evidence shows
that changes in minimum wages tend to have a larger impact on individuals at the
bottom of the wage distribution, namely young workers and females. Therefore an
increase in the existing minimum wage level might reduce the wage gender gap as
wages of females increase more than wages of males. However, the impact on the gap
may be ambiguous, if fringe benets and overtime payments which are usually not
regulated by the law are redistributed following a minimum wage increase.
Several studies have discussed whether employers reduce pecuniary and non-pecunia-
ry benets (e.g. health insurance, pension plan, meals, transportation, paid vacation,
accommodation and on-the-job training) as a response to a rise in the minimum wage
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Simon and Kaestner, 2004). The distribution of these bene-
ts is not necessarily gender-neutral. Furthermore, studies on the American labor mar-
ket nd that women are concentrated in occupations where fringe benets are higher
(Averett and Hotchkiss, 1995; Solberg and Laughlin, 1995; Lowen and Sicilian, 2009).
These studies suggest that the gender wage gaps within occupations are at least par-
tially explained by womens higher probability of receiving fringe benets. A natural
outcome of joint evaluation of these two bodies of literature is that, if a minimum wage
increase a¤ects the extra components of income, the gender gap at the base wage and
for the total payments may be a¤ected in di¤erent directions, depending on the gender
redistribution of benets.
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of a minimum wage increase on the gender gap
at various levels of employee compensation, namely, base wage, fringe benets, overtime
payments and overtime hours. We further explore the possible channels through which
the change in the minimum wage may a¤ect the gender gap on the base wage and the
extra income components in di¤erent directions. In doing so, we explore the e¤ect of
the 1998 amendment of the Portuguese minimum wage law, which increased its level
for employees younger than 18 years of age from 75% to 100% of the full minimum.
Such change in the legislation targeting a specic group of employees provides a natural
experiment environment, which allows for disentangling the minimum wage e¤ects from
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the e¤ects of other variables. In our analysis we use linked employer-employee data
for the Portuguese labor market, which provides detailed information on the extra
components of income at individual level.
To our knowledge, there is no other study investigating whether a rise in the min-
imum wage level results in a redistribution of fringe benets among di¤erent groups
of employees. Redistribution may arise from reasons such as industry or occupation
di¤erences in exibility of fringe benets with respect to a rise in the wage oor, em-
ployerswillingness to keep the wage hierarchy among workers with di¤erent charac-
teristics, or discrimination. On the other hand, employers may not be able or willing
to cut/redistribute benets for several reasons: the eventual decrease in worker pro-
ductivity due to lower incentives may be higher than the reduction in benets; or it
could be impossible to reduce benets of a particular group of employees, due either to
the nature of the working conditions or to legal reasons; or simply because the existing
amount of benets may not be high enough to allow adjustments (Holzer, Katz and
Krueger, 1991; Simon and Kaestner, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the empirical evidence
on the topic. Section 3 presents the data used and the wage distributions for minors
and adults. The impact of the minimum wage increase on di¤erent wage components
and on the gender gap is analyzed on Section 4. Section 5 discusses robustness checks
for the main results, while Section 6 explores some possible channels of labor earnings
redistribution in response to minimum wages legislation changes. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 The minimumwage, benets and the gender wage
gap: channels of transmission
There is some evidence in the literature regarding the fact that the minimum wage
(MW), a¤ecting the individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution, tends to have
a larger impact on youngsters and females. The introduction of a MW law, or any
increase in the existing MW level, will then reduce the gender gap as long as more
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women remain at the lower tail of the wage distribution than men.
Nevertheless, the impact of minimumwage laws on gender gap remains less explored.
In one of the few studies lling that gap in the literature, Meyer and Wise (1983)
conclude that women are more likely to become unemployed following the introduction
of MW. Shannon (1996) extends their analysis to measure the impact of MW on the
gender wage gap and observes a reduction of the gap following its introduction, which
he attributes to adverse unemployment e¤ects on females. Robinson (2002) investigates
the impact of the introduction of MW on the gender wage gap in Britain. She concludes
for a moderate e¤ect of the MW, which may result from the low level of the introduced
MW. In her following study, Robinson (2005) investigates the e¤ect of the MW for
British regions. Her ndings show that the larger the share of women among low paid
workers in a region and the longer the regional distance between the MW and the
average wage before its introduction, the bigger the reduction in the gender pay gap
after the introduction of the MW.
The gender gap is also likely to occur at the extra components of income, not
covered by MW laws.1 An important issue is whether or not rms respond to the MW
by adjusting fringe benets. There are studies that found a negative impact of MW on
fringe benets (Wessels, 1980; Sicilian and Grossberg, 1993). On the other hand, later
studies usually conclude that increases in MW are not o¤set by reductions in fringe
benets (Card and Krueger, 1995; Simon and Kaestner, 2004; Grossberg and Sicilian,
2004).
Depending on the exibility of the extra components of worker compensation with
respect to changes in the base wage, a MW increase also has the potential to increase the
gender gap at the total wage level, through redistribution of fringe benets and overtime
payments. This may occur through various channels.2 Firstly, if the employer has a
discriminatory taste, discrimination on labor compensation could occur at extra income
components for the minimum wage earners, assuming that there is compliance with
the law. Employers may exploit the window between the MW and overtime payments,
1There are few studies based on the U.S. labor market that investigate the relationship
between fringe benets and the gender wage gap (Averett and Hotchkiss, 1995; Solberg and
Laughlin, 1995; Lowen and Sicilian, 2009). The common implication of these studies is that
the gender gap becomes smaller when the distribution of benets is accounted for.
2We do not assert that these explanations are exhaustive.
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which are usually higher than the payments for normal hours. The discrimination could
arise either by paying di¤erent overtime hourly wages or by redistributing overtime
hours between male and female workers, according to his discriminatory preferences.
Another possibility is the discrimination on the provision of fringe benets. A MW
increase, then, may result in a wider gender gap at the total wage level if the gap on
fringe benets is rising faster than the reduction in the gap on the base wage.3
A second channel is the change in the skill composition of the workforce as a result of
a MW increase. Some recent studies assert that MW may result in an increase in both
the supply of and the demand for high-skilled labor. According to these studies, the
resulting substitution from low- to high-skilled workers masks the unemployment e¤ect
of the MW for the low-skilled ones (Ahn, Arcidiacono and Wessels, 2011; Cerejeira,
2008; Giuliano, 2011). If, as a result of a rise in the MW, high skilled male workers
increase their supply of labor, while the females do not respond in the same proportion,
there may be a change in the skill composition and the resulting wage gap may be
reecting the productivity di¤erences.
Industry and/or occupation di¤erences in the exibility of fringe benets with re-
spect to the changes in the MW level may act as a third channel for creating a gender
gap. This occurs when fringe benets provided in industries or occupations where fe-
males are concentrated are easier to adjust compared to the others. Di¤erences across
industries in mark-ups may also a¤ect the exibility of the benets. In industries where
prices are competitively determined, employers may respond to the increases in wage
costs by reducing extra payments. On the other hand, in less competitive industries,
namely in non-tradable goods sector, employers may prefer to adjust mark-up ratios if
reducing extra payments have productivity costs.
Summing up, empirical evidence on the role of MW in narrowing the gender wage
gap is rather moderate. The few existing papers on the subject only examined the
gender gap for the base wages, while the gap is likely to di¤er in the extra components
of income. Depending on the exibility of extra income components with respect to
changes in the MW, the gap at the base and full wage level may change in di¤erent
3The existence of and compliance with non-discriminatory laws on fringe benets may also
be e¤ective in the gender gap.
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directions. The present paper adds to the literature by analyzing the e¤ect of the MW
on gender wage gap and how it relates to fringe benets and overtime payments.
3 The Portuguese setting
3.1 Context and data
Since 1974, when the MW was rst introduced, Portugal moved from an initial stage
with several exemptions to the full minimum depending on the age of the worker, the
sector, and the rm size, to a stage where almost all workers are entitled to it. There
have been several amendments to the law that brought to an end the exemptions.4 As
of 1997, there were di¤erent MW levels applied to minors (workers younger than 18
years of age), apprentices and all the other employees: the minors and the apprentices
(regardless of their age) were entitled to 75% and 80% of the full MW, respectively. A
change in the law in August 1998 increased the minorsMW to the full minimum wage.
This meant a 33% further increase in their MW compared to adults. This amendment
was part of a series of legislation changes aiming at applying a single MW law to all
Portuguese employees and therefore is likely to have been exogenous with respect to
labor market conditions.
Our analysis benets from the quasi-natural experiment environment created by
the 1998 change, as well as from a comprehensive linked employer-employee data set
on the Portuguese labor market: Quadros de Pessoal (QP). The Portuguese Ministry
of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS) collects these data through an yearly ques-
tionnaire, which is mandatory for all rms with at least one employee. It includes
information on rms (such as location, industry, sales, number of employees, date of
constitution, legal setting, ownership type), its establishments and all its wage earners
(e.g. gender, age, education, hours of work, labor earnings, date of admission into the
rm). Civil servants and domestic service workers are not covered, and the coverage of
sectors such as sheries and agriculture is low given its low share of wage-earners.
QP contains four di¤erent wage categories: (i) base wage; (ii) overtime payments;
4See Almeida (2008) for a list of amendments in the MW law since 1974.
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(iii) regular benets, which may include meal plans, transportation, accommodation,
as well as compensations for seniority, productivity, attendance, hazardous work, night-
shift; and (iv) any irregular benets such as distributed prots, stock shares, Christmas
subsidies paid in advance, among others. As the MW law regulates only the rst cate-
gory, an additional wage gap is likely to occur at the remaining payment components.5
Due to data limitations we are not able to extend our analysis to the e¤ect of MW
on on-the-job training, neither do we conduct any analysis on the e¤ects on health
insurance and pensions since the contributions that have to be made by workers and
rms are explicitly dened by law. It is also worth mentioning that the MW is set
for monthly wages, but the law includes a formula for the calculation of the MW for
those who work less than the contractual hours.6 These may include, among others,
employees with part-time contracts and absentees for reasons such as sickness.
The 1998 amendment was implemented in August, while the data on yearly QP
questionnaires refer to October. These dates are important for our analysis, as the
decisions about schooling were already made and contracts for summer jobs were already
ended by the time the rms lled in the questionnaires. This means that our results are
not driven by the changes in employment caused by schooling decisions and temporary
jobs.
In 1997, the year before the amendment, the share of minor employees among the
total labor force was only 0:7% (see Table 1). This small share of minors is the reason
why we do not expect the amendment to have any spillover e¤ect on any other age
group in the labor market. The shares of females among adult and minor employees
were 40:7% and 43:8%, respectively. The share of females among adult employees
increased over time, while the trend ran in the opposite direction for minors. Because of
increasing schooling, the employment of minor females have been decreasing as opposed
to their adult counterparts. Their working hours have been decreasing as well, faster
than for any other group in the workforce. This general trend in employment for minors
and particularly for minor females prevents us from drawing any conclusions on the
5Given the higher level of payments for overtime hours, there has always been a window of
adjustment for this payment category.
6The formula is HMW = (MW 12)=(CWH 52), where HMW is hourly MW, and CWH
stands for contractual weekly working hours at industry level.
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employment e¤ects of the MW increase in 1998.
Table 1: Shares of minors and females
All Females
Minors Adults Minors
(1) (2) (3)
1995 0.009 0.397 0.455
1996 0.007 0.402 0.446
1997 0.007 0.407 0.438
1998 0.006 0.411 0.432
1999 0.005 0.418 0.426
2000 0.005 0.421 0.417
2002 0.004 0.419 0.397
2003 0.003 0.425 0.379
2004 0.003 0.426 0.376
2005 0.004 0.432 0.382
2006 0.003 0.437 0.378
2007 0.003 0.441 0.390
Notes: (1): share of minor employees
among the total labor force. (2): share
of female employees among the adult
labor force. (3): share of female em-
ployees among the minor labor force.
Source: own computations based on
Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
3.2 Evidence on wages
Figure 1 shows the distributions of wages for adults by gender for the period 1997
1999, which encompasses the year the amendment took place. The patterns of the
distributions in these selected years give us the general picture of the gender wage gap
and how it is a¤ected by the MW, in the Portuguese economy. The mode wage of
males is higher than the MW, which is also close to the level where the distribution for
females has a second spike. Males are visibly more concentrated at higher wage levels.
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The wages at the lower tail of the distribution, which are swept up to the MW, are
mostly female wages. This suggests the equalizing impact of MW at the adult level.
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Figure 1: Wage distributions for adults. Notes: The vertical line indicates the minimum wage.
Figures refer to log nominal monthly base wage in Euros. Employees earning less than 20% and more
than 10 times of the minimum wage are excluded from the density graphs to keep the tails short.
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
Figure 2 replicates Figure 1 for minors. Wage distributions for minor males and
females do not di¤er substantially before 1998. The two spikes in both the 1997 and
1998 graphs correspond to 75% and the full MW levels, respectively. This indicates
that a considerable fraction of minors were still earning pre-legislation wages in 1998.7
Since the amendment passed in August, and until that month minors were entitled
for 75% of the minimum, it is highly probable that in October the month for which
the questionnaires were lled in , some rms reported pre- and others post-legislation
wages. The switch between the heights of the 75% and 100% level spikes from 1997 to
1998 is in line with this explanation. After 1998, the lower spike shifts to the 80% level,
which was applied to apprentices.8
7It is also notable from the graphs that, although it was not a binding wage oor for minors
before 1998, employers paid the full MW to a high fraction of this age group - possibly showing
a numéraire e¤ect of the minimum wage.
8Before 1998, the MW for apprentices was binding for the adult employees only.
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Figure 2: Wage distributions for minors. Notes: The rst vertical line indicates MW for minors in
1997 and beginning of 1998 and MW for apprentices in 1999. The second vertical line in each graph
indicates the full minimum wage. Figures refer to log nominal monthly base wage in Euros. Employees
earning less than 20% and more than 5 times of the minimum wage are excluded from the density
graphs to keep the tails short. Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
The spikes in these wage distributions show that there has been compliance with
the MW law, and the MW level has been binding especially for minors and female
adults. The e¤ect of the 1998 amendment on the distribution of wages for the minors
is also apparent. Male and female wage distributions for minors before 1998 overlap
almost perfectly. As such, we do not expect an equalizing e¤ect from an increase in the
MW, but can it bring up a gender wage gap? We seek for this line of answers in the
following sections.
3.3 The wage gap over time
We now analyze the gender wage gap in Portugal and its evolution over time. We limit
the analysis to the post-1995 period, considering that several changes in the legislations
on schooling, as well as MW for teenagers, took place before that date, which were
expected to a¤ect labor market equilibrium for minors. After 1995, however, mandatory
schooling duration remained the same. The only change in the MW law which might
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a¤ect minors was the one which occurred in 1998.
In order to characterize the wage gap over time we estimate the following wage
equation:
Wit = 0 + 1Femalei + 2tYeart + 3tFemaleiYeart + 4Xit + "it; (1)
where Wit is log hourly real wage, Femalei is a dummy variable taking the value 1
for females, Yeart is a set of year dummy variables; Xit is a vector of control variables
including education, experience and its square, the log rm size, dummies for occupa-
tion, industry classication, and rm location; i stands for individual and t stands for
year (1995-2007).9 We estimate this equation for alternative age groups, as well as for
base wages and total wages, separately. The coe¢ cient of Femalei, 1, gives the wage
gap for 1995, which is the baseline year; 2t is the estimate for the yearly changes in
real wages compared to 1995; 3t captures the change in the wage gap relative to the
baseline year.
Figure 3 shows the estimation results for the gender wage gap for alternative age
groups and wage denitions.10 In each group the solid and the dashed lines show the
gender gap at the full wage and the base wage levels, respectively. It is clear that, in
Portugal, the gender gap is systematically higher at the full wage level. This observation
contrasts with ndings based on the U.S. data. For adults, the gap is approximately
5 percentage points higher at the total wage, while the di¤erence is smaller, but more
volatile, for minors. The previously mentioned di¤erences in the laws regulating the
provision of pension plans and health insurances are the most probable reasons for
this reversal between the two countries. In Portugal, all rms are obliged to pay the
same tax rate to cover these benets, regardless of the industry and occupation of the
worker, and these contributions are not accounted in the QP database. Therefore,
this eliminates the possibility of any gender bias in receiving these benets caused by
industrial or occupational crowding. Figure 3 also shows that the gender gap increases
with age.11
9Data for workers for the year 2001 was not made available by MTSS.
10The tables with the corresponding estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
11We include potential experience as regressor, which also accounts for age. Thus, it might be the
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Figure 3: Hourly adjusted gender wage gap. Notes: The underleying regressions are dened by
equation (1) and include, as control variables, education, experience and its square, log rm size, and
dummies for occupation, industry and rm location. Source: own computations based on Portugal,
MTSS (1995 to 2007).
Our main interest lies on the change in the gender gap for minors after the amend-
ment. The coe¢ cients for femaleyear for the pre-amendment period are all sta-
tistically insignicant and close to zero at both the base and the full wage levels for
minors; i.e., there was no average gender gap at ages below 18 years. However, there is
a visible widening of the hourly-wage gap following 1998, particularly for total wages:
the gap increased from  0:07% in 1997 to 1:9% in 1998 and further to 2:5% in 1999.
A question emerges: how much of this widening can be explained by the increase
in the MW? To answer this question, we compare the increase in the gap for minors
and for our control group, 20-25 year old employees. The adjusted hourly-wage gap for
the 20-25 years old employees was stable around 12% during this period, while the gap
on the base wage increased around one percentage point. The gap for the whole adult
group also shows a small increase. The di¤erence between the paths of the wage gap
for the minor and the other employees following the amendment is striking: within two
years the gap for minors increased about three percentage points more than the gap for
case that it is not the age that is correlated with the gap, but possibly the wage level itself, which
also increases with age. Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007), among others, provide convincing
evidence on increasing gender gap at the higher tail of the wage distribution.
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other groups, which is substantial considering the insignicant wage gap prior to the
amendment.
In the remaining parts of the paper we seek answers to the following questions. First,
is the di¤erence between the changes in the gap for minors and the others after the
amendment statistically signicant? Second, if that is the case, in which components of
total wage did the di¤erentiation occur? Third, what is the impact of the MW increase
on overtime payments and benets?
4 The impact of the minimum wage increase on dif-
ferent wage components and the gender gap
As the wages are set on an yearly basis in Portugal and the data reports to October,
some of the employers would be paying pre-amendment wages until October 1998.
Therefore, we do not expect to fully observe the e¤ect of the amendment on the wage
distributions before 1999 (see Figure 2). To account for the delayed e¤ects, we estimate
a wage equation for the 1997-1999 period, including the year of the amendment, one
year before and one year after the amendment and combining adults and minors.12 As
such, the empirical procedure is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DDD) setting
that compares the wages of males and females, minors and adults, before and after the
amendment:
Wit = 0 + 1Minori + 2Femalei + 3aftert
+ 4Minori  Femalei + 5Minori Aftert + 6Femalei  aftert
+ 7Femalei Minori Aftert + 8Xit + "it: (2)
In this setting,Minor is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the employee is younger
than 18 years of age, after is the period dummy, which is 1 for 1998 and after, while
the other elements of equation (2) are the same as in equation (1). The estimates for
the gender wage gap before the amendment for adults and minors are 2 and 2 + 4,
12See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a summary on the discussion of the delayed e¤ects
of the minimum wage.
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respectively. The wage increase for male adults between the two periods is captured by
3. The coe¢ cient on Femaleafter compares the gender gap for adults before and
after the amendment, while the analogous di¤erence for minors is captured by 6+ 7.
The main coe¢ cient of interest is 7, which compares the increases in the wage gap of
minors and the control group, adults.13 Therefore, the DDD estimator compares the
changes in the wage gap for minors with the same change for adults.
A usual concern in DDD analyses is the choice of the control group as a proper
reference. The control group is expected both to be immune to the e¤ect of policy
change and have a similar trend for the variable of analysis in absence of the treatment.
The very small share (0:7%) of the minor employees in 1998 makes it very unlikely that
the amendment had any ripple e¤ects on the rest of the labor force. Thus, we expect
any sub-group of the adult labor force to fulll the rst condition.
However, regarding the long-term trends in the gender gap, there are some di¤er-
ences among age groups. The gap is relatively volatile at younger age groups compared
to the adults (see Figure 3). Thus, choosing the whole adult cohort as the control
group has a potential to produce spurious results in a DDD setting. To eliminate this
possibility, we have chosen the employees of 20-25 years of age as the control group,
which also has a similar trend as the minors in the absence of a policy change.14
Table 2 reports the estimation results for alternative payment categories and Table
3 reports the estimation results for overtime hours. Because all dependent variables in
the payment equations are in logs, employees receiving zero overtime payment and/or
benet are dropped from the respective equations and this justies the di¤erences in
the number of observations across sets of results. Thus, besides measuring the e¤ect
13In an alternative expression, 7 gives us the following:
[E (WjFemale = 0;Minor = 1;After = 0; X)  E (W jFemale = 1;Minor = 1;After = 0;X)]
  [E (WjFemale = 0;Minor = 1;After = 1; X)  E (W jFemale = 1;Minor = 1;After = 1;X)]
  f[E (WjFemale = 0;Minor = 0;After = 0; X)  E (W jFemale = 1;Minor = 0;After = 0;X)]
  [E (WjFemale = 0;Minor = 0;After = 1; X)  E (W jFemale = 1;Minor = 0;After = 1;X)]g
where the rst term is the wage gap before 1998 for minors and the second term is the wage
gap for 1998 and 1999 for minors. The di¤erence between them is the change in the wage gap
for minors. Finally, the third term is the change in the gap for adults.
14It is possible to create almost an innite number of alternative control groups among the
adult employees. We should note that in a number of experiments we conducted with di¤erent
control groups we achieved similar results for the main e¤ect we discuss. See the robustness
checks for further discussion on this issue.
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on the gender wage gap for those earning positive overtime payments and benets, it is
also important to control for selection bias related to the probability of receiving these
extra incomes. Results based on Heckman selection regressions are shown in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 2 for overtime payments, and in columns (6) and (7) for benets,
in the same table.
The selection equation requires the inclusion of some variables that a¤ect the chance
for overtime work or receiving benets but not the wage. The variables chosen are the
share of workers older than 25 years that worked overtime within the rm, for the
overtime selection equation (% Overtime Hourst 1), and the share of workers older
than 25 years that received any kind of benets within the rm, for the benets selection
equation (% Benefitst 1). The rationale behind the choice of these variables is based
on the assumption that using overtime work and benets payments are not only related
with worker characteristics but also with the rm strategy concerning human resources
management. We expect that workers employed in rms that make greater use of
overtime work and of benets payments have more probability of work overtime or
receive benets. We opt for including the (one year) lag of those variables in order to
reect long-run rm policies and not short-run demand shocks.
The coe¢ cient of FemaleMinorafter is signicant and negative for all wage
denitions, except for the base wage. The result for the base wage is something we
would expect as the law regulates this category. However, for overtime payments and
fringe benets, there are relevant increases in the gender gap. For overtime payments,
the increase is 26 percentage points. However, its e¤ect on the gender gap for the total
wage should be relatively small, concerning the small share of minors working extra
hours (see Table 10). There is also an increase of about 5:2 percentage points in the
gender gap regarding fringe benets for minors, but it is not statistically signicant at
10% signicance level. Overall, we observe a 2:7 percentage points increase in the total
hourly gender pay gap for minors between 1997 and 1999.15
15Computations based on monthly wages reinforce these conclusions - see Table 12.
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The Heckman selection results for overtime payments, Table 2, column (4), indi-
cate that our additional variable in the selection equation is statistically signicant.
However, a Wald test for the independency of the equations does not reject the null
hypothesis,16 and therefore the results for the OLS and Heckman model are virtually
the same (columns (2) and (3)). Looking to the Heckman model for benets, columns
(6) and (7), we conclude that the additional variable in the selection equation is statis-
tically signicant at the 1% signicance level. We now reject the independency between
the main equation for benets and the selection equation.17 It is particularly interesting
with this last result that the coe¢ cient for the triple interaction,  0:107,18 is statisti-
cally signicant at the 5% signicance level: female minors became less likely to receive
benets.
Despite the redistribution of benets and overtime payments against the minor fe-
males after the amendment, their adjusted hourly real total wage increased around
3:7 percentage points further than the adult females

^5 + ^7

. The analogous in-
crease for the minor males was 6:4 percentage points

^5

. In other words, the re-
duction/redistribution of fringe benets was not large enough to dominate the increase
of the base wage of both male and female workers. This result is in line with above-
mentioned studies which found limited e¤ect of MW on reductions of the fringe benets.
The increase in the gender gap for overtime payments could be explained by changing
overtime hourly wages or by redistributing overtime hours. We explore these hypothesis
running a set of regressions, using OLS and count data models (Tobit and Negative-
Binomial), which allow for a large number of zero observations and for a small set of
discrete values for the dependent variable (number of hours). Results are presented in
Table 3.
The marginal e¤ect of minFem after shows that there are no signicant de-
crease in the quantity of overtime worked hours for minor females after amendment
compared with minor males. Looking at column (4), Table 3, we observe that the es-
16We have a (1) = 1:75 test statistic, with a corresponding p  value of 0:1859.
17We have a (1) = 20:19 test statistic, with a corresponding p  value of about 0.
18The marginal e¤ect is about  2:5 percentage points.
17
timate for the e¤ect of the triple interaction is marginally insignicant.19 The positive
sign of the coe¢ cient of this variable reinforces the conclusion that the widening gender
gap regarding overtime payments is not related with changes in the gender distribution
of overtime hours. Combining this result with the previous one on the probability of
receiving benets, it seems to be the case that the overall widening of the gender pay
gap for minors is due to a redistribution of benets and to a decrease in the price of
overtime work for females.
Table 3: Regressions: overtime hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OverH-OLS OverH-Tobit OverH-NB
Minor 0.176 0.319 0.342 1.178
(0.146) (1.595) (0.190) [2.35]
{0.125}
Female -0.514 -4.681 -0.590 -1.290
(0.035) (0.295) (0.044) [163.03]
{0.000}
After -0.139 -0.053 -0.032 -0.092
(0.034) (0.234) (0.032) [1.02]
{0.312}
Minor  Female 0.386 0.848 0.238 0.081
(0.155) (2.341) (0.240) [0.01]
{0.924}
Minor  After 0.216 0.901 -0.164 -0.635
(0.159) (1.838) (0.202) [0.65]
{0.419}
Female  After 0.008 -0.017 0.149 0.291
(0.040) (0.347) (0.049) [6.91]
{0.009}
Min  Fem  After 0.315 4.160 0.420 1.728
(0.198) (2.840) (0.290) [2.66]
{0.103}
Observations 601134 601134 601134
R2 0.064 0.096 0.033
LogLikelihood -201995 -370293 -407546
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. R2 is pseudo after
column (1). The dependent variable is the number of overtime hours. All regressions
include education, experience and its square, log rm size, occupation dummies,
industry dummies and rm location dummies as control variables. Column (4)
reports the marginal e¤ects for the model estimated in column (3). Qui-square
statistic in brackets; p-value in curly breackets.
19The qui-squared statistic has a p  value of 0:103.
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5 Robustness checks
We will now discuss robustness checks on our main results. As discussed earlier, if the
e¤ect we detect using the DDD methodology is a result of the amendment to the law,
we should not be able to detect the same e¤ect for years without treatment. To check
this, we apply placebo amendments to the other years in the panel. By doing so, we
test whether the DDD methodology produces negative signicant coe¢ cients for the
triple interaction term for the years when there was no increase in the MW. We run
regressions based on equation (2) by replacing the dummy after with aftert taking
the value 1 for the year t of the placebo amendment and afterwards. We run each
equation for two-year intervals, as we did for the main regressions.20 In each equation,
the dependent variable is the log hourly real total wage.
Looking at Table 4, there is not a single year where we detect a signicant coe¢ cient
for the triple interaction term. This conclusion remains almost the same when we use the
whole adult workforce as the control group, which has a much more stable gender gap
over the years (see Table 13 in the Appendix). The coe¢ cient for the triple interaction
for 1998 indicates a 3:0 percentage points increase in the gender gap for the minors,
while we do not detect a negative signicant coe¢ cient for the other years. This set
of results reinforce our conclusion in the previous section: the law amendment that
occurred in 1998 is associated with an increase in the wage gap for minors.
20Due to data unavailability for 2001, the placebo amendment for 2000 is based only on
1999 and 2000 data; and the placebo for 2002 compares the years 2000 and 2002. Similarly,
the placebo for 1997 does not include 1998 data, as this is the year of the amendment.
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A second robustness check follows Averett and Hotchkiss (1995) and Oyer (2008).
They establish a link between benets and working hours. In case of a positive link
between the two, one may still assert that the increasing gender gap for hourly wages
after the amendment may be a result of long term decrease in the working hours of
the minor females more pronounced than for minor males, instead of being the e¤ect
of the amendment. To control for this, we run equation (2) for total wage including
log of actual working hours as explanatory variable. The results are reported in Table
5. Despite the fact that benets and working hours are correlated, the coe¢ cient of
the triple interaction term is still signicant with a value of  0:03 in both hourly
and monthly equations, meaning that the results we obtained are robust even after
controlling for working hours.
Table 5: Robustness ckecks: controlling for working hours
Hourly Total Monthly Total Hourly Monthly
Wage Wage Benets Benets
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Log Hours -0.247 0.753 -0.490 0.485
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Min  Fem  After -0.030 -0.030 -0.065 -0.067
(0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 659133 659133 444763 444763
R2 0.384 0.491 0.179 0.169
LogLikelihood -188470 -188470 -558463 -557736
RMSE 0.322 0.322 0.849 0.848
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. All regressions include education,
experience and its square, log rm size, and dummies for occupation, industry and rm location.
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
These robustness checks show that the signicant widening in the gender gap for
the minor employees after the 1998 amendment is specic to that year and it remains
even if we use an alternative control group. The increase in the gap was not a result
of long-term reduction in the working hours of minor females. We will now discuss
21
the possible channels that may have caused the gender gap to increase in extra income
components.
6 The increase in gender gap: possible explanations
Previously we discussed three possible channels that may lead a MW increase to widen
the gender gap at the total wage level. We can summarize these channels as (i) a
change in the skill composition of the working males and females after the increase
in the minimum wage, (ii) industrial and/or occupational di¤erences in response to
the changes in the wage oor and (iii) discrimination. In this section we explore the
explanatory power of these channels for the case of the 1998 amendment. For the rst
channel, we follow a two-stage strategy. In the rst stage we estimate a xed-e¤ects
wage regression to obtain a measure for the individualstime invariant skills. In the
second stage we test whether there is a signicant relative change in the individual time
invariant skills of minor females who entered the labor market after the amendment.
To test the validity of the second and the third channels, we divide the panel in sub-
industries and run our wage regressions to evaluate the e¤ect of the amendment in each
of them.
Starting with the rst channel, we estimate the following wage equation for the
whole panel with data between 1995 and 2007:
Wit = 0 + 1Xit + i + "it; (3)
whereWit is the total log hourly real wage; Xit is the vector of control variables includ-
ing experience squared and log rm size, as well as dummies for years 1996 to 2007,
industries, locations and occupations; i is the individual time inavariant skills mea-
sure. Our aim is to check whether the average individual skills for the female minors
who entered the workforce after the amendment are relatively lower than the average
of those who entered before the amendment. To do so, we estimate a second stage
equation, where the dependent variable is the estimated i:
22
^i = 0 + 1femalei + 2admission99i + 3femaleiadmission99i + i; (4)
where admission99 is 1 for entrants in 1999, 0 otherwise. Equation (4) is estimated
for minors who entered the workforce in 1997 and 1999. The t test on 3 allows to
test weather there is a signicant change in the relative individual characteristics of the
minor females compared to males, between those two years.
Table 6: Change in the skill composition - estimation results
Coe¢ cient St. Error
female -0.144 (0.007)
admission99 -0.051 (0.007)
female  admission99 0.008 (0.010)
Observations 9175
R2 0.085
RMSE 0.240
Notes: Signicance level:    : 1%. The dependent variable
is the individual xed e¤ect. Source: own computations based
on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
There is a decrease in the average individual skills for minors entering the labor
market after 1997, which is not, however, di¤erent between males and females (see
Table 6) the coe¢ cient of femaleadmission99 does not indicate a relative change
in female individual skills. The general increasing trend in schooling for minors is a
possible explanation for the rst result as less skilled minors could enter earlier in the
labor market.
We now investigate the explanatory power of the remaining two possibilities. We
conduct similar analyses to the previous section for separate industries. In 1997, the
year before the amendment, about 86% of minor workers were concentrated in four
industries: textiles, other manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade
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(see Table 9 in the Appendix).21 There is a visible concentration of females in textiles
(73:3% of minor employees). In construction, other manufacturing and wholesale and
retail the shares were 1:3%; 21:5% and 31:2%, respectively.
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5
1995 1998 2000 2005
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Figure 4: Note: average di¤erences between the full and the base wages by industries (in log points).
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
There are some reasons why fringe benets and overtime payments might have re-
acted di¤erently across industries to the raise in the MW. Firstly, the textiles was the
most a¤ected industry by the amendment, because of the higher share of the minor em-
ployees among its labor force. Secondly, the textiles industry was the only sector where
the relative di¤erence between total and base wage was higher for minors, until 2000
see Figure 4. Thirdly, the textiles industry was already under pressure by increasing
international competition, especially from China. Therefore, employers could mitigate
the e¤ect of the MW increase on operating costs by reducing the extra-payments com-
ponent. It is clear from Figure 4 that the gap between adults and minors in these
industries narrowed considerably after 1998.
21Textiles include textiles, wearing apparel and leather products. Other manufacturing includes
wood, cork, and paper manufacturing, metallic and non-metallic products and furniture. Wholesale
and retail trade includes wholesale and retail trade, repairments, as well as hotels and restaurants.
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Table 7 reports the estimation results for changes in the base wages, overtime pay-
ments, benets and total wages, for each of these industry categories for the minor
workers (excluding the gender dimension).22 The results show that there are clear dif-
ferences in adjustments of fringe benets and overtime payments after the MW increase
among industries. In textiles, as well as in construction, there are signicant reductions
in the minorsextra income components after the amendment. The e¤ect is stronger
for Textiles. As a result, the total wage increase of 2:1 percentage points for minors in
textiles remained the lowest (see Table 7).
The small increase in wages for this female-concentrated industry provides an expla-
nation for the widening gap after the amendment. This explanation, however, does not
eliminate the possibility of redistribution of fringe benets from female to male workers
within industries. To test this, we estimate equation (2) for each industry and report
the results in Table 8.23 There is no increase in the minor gender gap within textiles
after the amendment, and the increase in the manufacturing is not statistically signif-
icant. However, there is a signicant and very strong (5:2 percentage points) increase
in the gap within the wholesale and retail industry.
The interpretation of the latter result in the gender gap is not straightforward.
Assuming that there are no structural di¤erences among the sub-sectors of wholesale
and retail industry and considering very similar individual characteristics of this group
of workers because of their age, an institutional explanation to the widening gender gap
would be the discrimination against females. If the amendment had increased the MW
to a level that mostly male employees were considered to be privileged for, employers
might have used the extra components of income to create the wage hierarchy they
desired.
22The equation is a variation of equation (2):
Wit = 0 + 1Minori + 2After98t + 5Minori After98t+3Xit+"it;
where X excludes industrial dummies. The control group is composed by the 20 to 25 year
old employees.
23We exclude construction, as the total number of minor females in this industry was only
20.
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Table 8: DDD estimations for each industry
Textiles Other Wholesale
manufacturing and retail
(i) (ii) (iii)
Minor -0.169 -0.222 -0.251
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Female -0.136 -0.161 -0.083
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
After 0.070 0.076 0.070
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Minor  Female 0.068 0.124 0.159
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Minor  After 0.011 0.037 0.090
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Female  After -0.0008 -0.025 -0.022
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Min  Fem  After 0.009 -0.019 -0.052
(0.017) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 110770 120726 162760
R2 0.188 0.314 0.27
LogLikelihood 4388.14 -29989.99 -46557.80
RMSE 0.233 0.310 0.322
Notes: Signicance levels:  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%. The
dependent variable is log hourly real total wage. All regressions include
education, experience and its square, log rm size, and dummies for oc-
cupation, industry and rm location. Source: own computations based
on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
Based on these results we conclude that industrial di¤erences in the exibility of
extra income payments was an important source of the increasing gender gap after the
amendment. In the textiles industry, where the minors have a higher share compared
to the other industries, employers responded to the MW increase with signicant re-
ductions in overtime payments and fringe benets. As a result, the increase in the
total wages in the textiles remained smaller when compared to the increase registered
in the other industries, which is not surprising due to its high degree of openness to
27
international trade. A secondary source for the increase in the gender gap might have
been the di¤erentiation of male and female wages within the wholesale and retail in-
dustry, industries of the non-tradable goods sector, where employers may opt to adjust
mark-up ratios if reducing extra payments have productivity costs.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides new insights on the gender wage gap following an increase in min-
imum wage, and relates it to the distribution of fringe benets and overtime payments.
We use matched employer-employee data on the Portuguese labor market and bene-
t from a quasi-natural experiment provided by a nation-wide increase in the minor
employeesminimum wage in 1998. We conducted separate analysis for base wage,
overtime payments and fringe benets, as well as for the amount of overtime work.
Estimation results based on a di¤erence-in-di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology show
a widening of the gender gap among minor workers following the amendment, explained
mainly by a redistribution of fringe benets and overtime payments in favor of males.
We explore three possible channels of redistribution, namely, discrimination, asym-
metric changes in the skill composition of male and female employees as a result of
the minimum wage increase, and di¤erences in the exibility of extra payments among
industries where females have di¤erent shares. The analysis at the industry level shows
that inter-industry di¤erences in exibility of adjustment of fringe benets and over-
time payments contribute to the increasing gap. We also observe an increase in the
unexplained gender gap within wholesale and retail industry, which may indicate dis-
crimination as a contributing factor.
Summing up, the distribution of fringe benets and overtime payments are not
gender-neutral. Contrary to the ndings of previous studies on the U.S. labor market,
we nd that the gender gap becomes wider when we account for extra components of
income. The equalizing impact of the minimum wage increase on the gender gap is not
warranted as long as there is industry crowding and di¤erent competitive environments,
and substantial di¤erences across these industries in the adjustment of extra components
of income.
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Appendix
Table 9: Employment by major industries before and after the amendment
1997 1999
Total Minors Only Total Minors Only
Number %Females Number %Females Number %Females Number %Females
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Textiles 266656 69.96 5124 73.32 261259 70.55 3331 73.85
% Total Employment 13.84 23.72 38.09 63.66 12.45 20.98 32.01 55.39
Other manufactures 381070 27.53 2925 21.47 406115 29.19 1962 17.38
% Total Employment 19.78 13.34 21.74 10.64 19.35 13.49 18.85 7.68
Construction 198645 7.16 1736 1.32 223213 7.76 1558 1.35
% Total Employment 10.31 1.81 12.91 0.39 10.64 1.97 14.97 0.47
Wholesale and retail 395234 40.09 1771 31.17 434720 41.97 1657 37.78
% Total Employment 20.52 20.15 13.17 9.35 20.72 20.76 15.92 14.10
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
Table 10: Shares of extra income receivers
Adults Minors
Males Females Males Females
Overtime Benet Overtime Benet Overtime Benet Overtime Benet
workers receivers workers receivers workers receivers workers receivers
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1995 0.086 0.581 0.048 0.537 0.019 0.498 0.026 0.613
1996 0.087 0.592 0.051 0.542 0.022 0.488 0.039 0.565
1997 0.092 0.617 0.054 0.575 0.033 0.574 0.031 0.675
1998 0.094 0.630 0.056 0.587 0.035 0.590 0.044 0.673
1999 0.085 0.630 0.055 0.590 0.038 0.604 0.052 0.652
2000 0.096 0.657 0.067 0.632 0.048 0.627 0.077 0.656
2002 0.093 0.674 0.064 0.656 0.054 0.666 0.082 0.668
2003 0.092 0.690 0.063 0.671 0.057 0.682 0.074 0.704
2004 0.099 0.698 0.068 0.679 0.061 0.696 0.077 0.713
2005 0.102 0.700 0.072 0.674 0.062 0.700 0.076 0.695
2006 0.100 0.706 0.066 0.676 0.064 0.709 0.062 0.706
2007 0.099 0.712 0.067 0.687 0.063 0.724 0.061 0.708
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
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Table 11: Means and standard-deviations of individual character-
istics
Adults Minors
Education Age Experience Education Age Experience
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1995 6.626 37.476 20.941 5.647 17.175 1.253
(3.536) (11.640) (11.801) (1.562) (0.605) (0.502)
1996 6.782 37.684 21.108 5.896 17.233 1.275
(3.588) (11.616) (11.804) (1.736) (0.552) (0.492)
1997 6.899 37.663 21.056 6.067 17.282 1.302
(3.621) (11.617) (11.830) (1.843) (0.492) (0.457)
1998 7.088 37.861 21.200 6.432 17.312 1.323
(3.685) (11.625) (11.875) (1.999) (0.473) (0.447)
1999 7.207 37.919 21.224 6.500 17.354 1.363
(3.715) (11.585) (11.855) (2.079) (0.451) (0.430)
2000 7.384 38.035 21.290 6.711 17.333 1.344
(3.760) (11.557) (11.858) (2.089) (0.476) (0.449)
2002 7.714 38.187 21.341 7.059 17.324 1.334
(3.850) (11.452) (11.805) (2.158) (0.476) (0.450)
2003 7.881 38.383 21.491 7.168 17.348 1.353
(3.867) (11.371) (11.739) (2.115) (0.464) (0.443)
2004 8.078 38.536 21.586 7.417 17.319 1.323
(3.890) (11.321) (11.712) (2.083) (0.486) (0.469)
2005 8.298 38.435 21.410 7.538 17.305 1.305
(3.925) (11.346) (11.767) (2.102) (0.479) (0.468)
2006 8.548 38.652 21.545 7.834 17.312 1.307
(3.945) (11.314) (11.774) (2.064) (0.485) (0.480)
2007 8.752 38.879 21.703 7.994 17.322 1.313
(3.957) (11.336) (11.829) (2.083) (0.489) (0.478)
Source: own computations based on Portugal, MTSS (1995 to 2007).
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